RESUMO
Importance: Healthcare organizations operate in a data-rich environment and depend on digital computerized systems; thus, they may be exposed to cyber threats. Indeed, one of the most vulnerable sectors to hacks and malware is healthcare. However, the impact of cyberattacks on healthcare organizations remains under-investigated. Objective: This study aims to describe a major attack on an entire medical center that resulted in a complete shutdown of all computer systems and to identify the critical actions required to resume regular operations. Setting: This study was conducted on a public, general, and acute care referral university teaching hospital. Methods: We report the different recovery measures on various hospital clinical activities and their impact on clinical work. Results: The system malfunction of hospital computers did not reduce the number of heart catheterizations, births, or outpatient clinic visits. However, a sharp drop in surgical activities, emergency room visits, and total hospital occupancy was observed immediately and during the first postattack week. A gradual increase in all clinical activities was detected starting in the second week after the attack, with a significant increase of 30% associated with the restoration of the electronic medical records (EMR) and laboratory module and a 50% increase associated with the return of the imaging module archiving. One limitation of the present study is that, due to its retrospective design, there were no data regarding the number of elective internal care hospitalizations that were considered crucial. Conclusions and relevance: The risk of ransomware cyberattacks is growing. Healthcare systems at all levels of the hospital should be aware of this threat and implement protocols should this catastrophic event occur. Careful evaluation of steady computer system recovery weekly enables vital hospital function, even under a major cyberattack. The restoration of EMR, laboratory systems, and imaging archiving modules was found to be the most significant factor that allowed the return to normal clinical hospital work.
RESUMO
OBJECTIVE: To describe the challenges facing the obstetric division following a cyberattack and discuss ways of preparing for and overcoming another one. METHODS: A retrospective descriptive study conducted in a mid-sized medical center. Division activities, including the number of deliveries, cesarean sections, emergency room visits, admissions, maternal-fetal medicine department occupancy, and ambulatory encounters, from 2 weeks before the attack to 8 weeks following it (a total of 11 weeks), were compared with the retrospective period in 2019 (pre-COVID-19). In addition, we present the challenges and adaptation measures taken at the division and hospital levels leading up to the resumption of full division activity. RESULTS: On the day of the cyberattack, critical decisions were made. The media announced the event, calling on patients not to come to our hospital. Also, all elective activities other than cesarean deliveries were stopped. The number of deliveries, admissions, and both emergency room and ambulatory clinic visits decreased by 5%-10% overall for 11 weeks, reflecting the decrease in division activity. Nevertheless, in all stations, there were sufficient activities and adaptation measures to ensure patient safety, decision-making, and workflow of patients were accounted for. CONCLUSIONS: The risk of ransomware cyberattacks is growing. Healthcare systems at all levels should recognize this threat and have protocols for dealing with them once they occur.
